The opening sentence in the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ October 2025 Force Design update asserts: “The Marine Corps is a globally responsive, lethal, and resilient combined-armed naval expeditionary force that projects power from sea to land and land to sea, fighting as a Marine Air Ground Task Force across all domains in contested environments to deter, deny, and defeat adversaries.”
This statement is aspirational. It does not reflect the current state of the Marine Corps, which is best characterized as a force lacking balanced lethality and battlefield resiliency. Until the senior leadership comes to grip with this truth, the Corps will remain a service in stasis. Optimistic expressions ring hollow when confronted with the realities of resources, defense budgets, Department of War acceptance, and congressional support.
The capability of fighting in every “clime and place” and task organizing for any mission are longstanding hallmarks of the Marines. Unfortunately, the Corps’ ability to respond quickly and effectively to global threats or to tailor a force capable of defeating any adversary were degraded by an unwise “divest to invest” approach to transformation, originally and innocuously termed “Force Design 2030.”
The adverse effects of Force Design continue to plague Marines almost six years after its inception. These include the loss of combined arms capabilities and resilience, reductions in requirements for amphibious ships, emasculation of the Maritime Prepositioning Force, and disregard for an integrated and disciplined combat development process. Words alone will not fix these problems.
The Commandant offers worthy goals for a ready and capable 911 force and strong and resilient regimental, brigade, and corps-size Marine Air Ground Task Forces, or MAGTFs. But unless rhetoric is backed by actions and resources, it is little more than empty, if aspirational, expressions. Restoring the Marines’ ability to be the nation’s expeditionary force-in-readiness will require significant investments in new and improved supporting arms, such as expeditionary bridging and assault breaching, mobile protected direct-fire support, cannon artillery, aviation and logistics.
It will also require the Marines working with the Navy to improve amphibious ship readiness rates and move beyond the requirement for 31 traditional amphibious ships as well as rebuilding the depleted Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons. To his credit, the Commandant has been arguing for enough ships to maintain a minimum steady presence of 3.0 Amphibious Ready Groups/ Marine Expeditionary Units (ARGs/MEUs). Achieving this goal will require improved readiness rates and almost certainly more than 31 ships. We believe additional ships are also required to reinforce deployed ARGs/MEUs if necessary or to respond to emerging threats in other theaters. The evolving National Defense Strategy is expected to focus more heavily on the Western Hemisphere. It will not alleviate the requirement for naval forces to respond globally when our national interests are threatened.
These are not easy or short-term fixes. Still, there are things that can and must be done now. These initiatives are “low-hanging fruit” that will improve the Corps’ capabilities to confront not only China but other adversaries threatening U.S. security interests.
The Commandant would be wise to turn the two Marine Littoral Regiments back into traditional regiments; replace the concept for small, isolated and widely separated Stand-in Forces with forces that are survivable and sustainable; halt the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) and Naval Strike Missile programs; and move away from the Landing Ship Medium.
The purpose-built Marine Littoral Regiment, long-delayed NMESIS, and relatively short-range Naval Strike Missile are largely irrelevant today and arguably more so in the future. The Naval Strike Missile is ill-suited for attacking ships from fixed positions ashore given its subsonic speed and less-than-200-mile range. Isolated and widely separated Stand-in Forces and the 14-knot, lightly armed, and unprotected Landing Ship Medium are not survivable in contested waters. Were none of the NMESIS, Naval Strike Missile and Landing Ship Medium tactical limitations bad enough, the fielding delays should be a coup de grace for all three programs.
According to the FD 2025 update: “The Service fielded the first six NMESIS launchers to 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment in 2023 and continues to build capacity toward 18 launchers per medium-range missile system launcher battery, which will be fully realized in FY 33.” If the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment will not have its full complement of launchers for seven years, when will the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment have its full complement? How long will it take to field the NMESIS for the remaining planned 12 missile batteries?
The fielding schedule for the first nine Landing Ship Medium prototype vessels that Congress authorized for “testing and experimentation” is well into the future. The lead ship is not expected to be delivered until 2029 or later. At best, these ships will compete with traditional amphibious ships for funding and manning. At worst, they will count against the 31-amphibious-ship requirement.
The Marines have lethal, supportable, and sustainable options to these ill-conceived programs—task organize for any mission from the Corps’ toolkit of capabilities, augmented with new and better munitions and equipment as appropriate.
Better options than the Naval Strike Missile include the upcoming 300-mile Increment 2 variant of the ballistic Precision Strike Missile, launched by the High Mobility Artillery Rocker Launcher System (HIMARS); and the F-35-launched, anti-ship Joint Strike Missile and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. There is no need to continue down the current path of a largely purpose-built, regional defense force that is neither survivable nor sustainable inside hotly contested areas. If the Marines need a Stand-in Force, tailor it to be a combined arms Marine Expeditionary Brigade or Marine Expeditionary Force-size force, supported by traditional amphibious ships and Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons.
These are steps the Marines could take today to improve global response and strengthen the MAGTF. But more will need to be done to fully realize the aspirational words of the 39th Commandant. He and his successors must set a new course that fully restores the Marine Corps as the Nation’s expeditionary force-in-readiness. This journey will not be quick or easy. It will take time, resources, and Department of War and congressional support.
Charles Krulak served as the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Michael Hagee served as the 33rd Commandant of the Marine Corps.
James Conway served as the 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps.
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