Europe is finally putting real money behind defense, but a deeper problem remains: who or what will coordinate this new security effort?
With the European Union’s recently announced ReArm Europe Plan—a multi-pillar framework aimed at boosting defense investment—the money is beginning to flow, and European capitals are starting to ramp up their defense budgets accordingly. Long-delayed plans to rebuild hollowed-out armed forces are moving forward. Public and private sectors are beginning to align to revive Europe’s defense industrial base.
So far, the debate over the future of the European security landscape has largely focused on military capabilities. In recent months, policymakers and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic have focused on identifying weapons and capabilities European countries should prioritize on their defense shopping lists. This is understandable in an era of burden-shifting, when the U.S. role as Europe’s primary security provider is likely to diminish.
But Europe’s defense challenge is as much organizational as it is operational. Reconstituting itself as a credible security actor after decades of strategic neglect requires more than funding and procurement. This is a question not simply of resources but of institutional design and coordination. The choices made now—not only about who leads and commands forces in future European security contingencies, but also about who facilitates and manages the coming wave of defense investment—will shape Europe’s ability to act decisively and coherently for decades to come.
While some analysts point to the European Union as a long-term answer, most European civilian and military policymakers are clear that they do not see it that way. To them, the EU remains primarily an economic and political union, not a vehicle for hard power. Even in a future where the U.S. plays a reduced role, they would prefer to work within and through NATO.
While the longer-term question of how to reconfigure NATO so that Europeans shoulder more of the organizational burden—staff planning, command structures, and operational leadership—will take years to resolve, the more immediate and pressing question is: who will coordinate the surge in defense spending about to get underway?
Such coordination is essential not only to avoid waste and duplication of effort but also ensure interoperability and alignment with the new NATO capability targets. Without it, Europe risks squandering a rare window of opportunity where political will and financial commitment have finally aligned.
So who should lead?
A leading candidate for this near-term coordination role is U.S. European Command, the U.S. combatant command responsible for the European area of operations.
The commander of EUCOM is dual-hatted as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, but the alliance’s military headquarters at SHAPE—Allied Command Operations—is unsuited for the coordination job. For one thing, it operates under the political authority of the North Atlantic Council and is designed to engage “up and out” with political decision-makers who determine the overall strategic direction of the Alliance. For another, ACO’s operational focus leaves little capacity for this new role.
EUCOM, on the other hand, is structurally better positioned to do it. Acting under its Title 10 (Chapter 16) authorities for security cooperation, the command can reach “down and in” to national capitals across the European continent, helping to build partner military and institutional capacity. Unlike NATO’s operational-and-tactical-level headquarters, whose visibility into the national forces of allies comes from the National Military Representatives or the episodic, deliberately choreographed Alliance-wide exercises—EUCOM maintains continuous, ground-level insight into Europe’s armed forces through programs like the State Partnership Program, which pairs U.S. National Guard units with European national militaries to improve readiness. It sees the full 360-degree picture, including the good, the bad, and the ugly of these national defense institutions, 365 days a year. This situational awareness and understanding of where the gaps lie as well as knowledge about who is planning to purchase what system, will be essential in the next phase of Europe’s security transformation.
Then there is the acquisition side. Like other combatant commands, EUCOM plays a key, if informal, role in the Foreign Military Sales process by providing information on systems and platforms and facilitating connections between countries and industry. As the West ramps up defense production and grapples with depleted stockpiles, this role will only grow in importance. An empowered EUCOM can help European countries align their purchases and ensure they are on track with NATO capability targets.
Finally, as the theater command with responsibility for all of Europe—including non-NATO members—EUCOM is uniquely positioned to take a holistic approach, unencumbered by institutional and membership divides between NATO and the EU. Its reach extends to countries that belong to neither organization, a strategic asset that recently demonstrated its value: When the Germany–Switzerland–Ukraine Patriot deal came together in July, responsibility for executing it fell to EUCOM.
The good news is that EUCOM is ready to perform this coordination role. The bad news is that it currently lacks the resources to do so effectively. Security cooperation funding is controlled by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, not by EUCOM itself. If the administration is serious about shifting the long-term burden to Europe, it must provide EUCOM with the short-term funding and authorities needed to help guide that transition.
Such funding could come either from already earmarked DSCA resources or through additions to the European Deterrence Initiative—formerly the primary funding source for EUCOM’s posture adjustments—which has since been folded into the Defense Department’s base budget and is no longer tracked as a standalone line item.
The key, however, is flexibility: EUCOM must be empowered to decide how and where to spend those resources—say, to expand its coordination cell or target critical European capability gaps—without being slowed down by decision-making bottlenecks in Washington.
Would European governments accept EUCOM’s help? Yes. European leaders expect the U.S. to withdraw forces from the continent in the coming months but are uneasy because of the opaque nature of the U.S. decision-making process. They are calling for a clear and coordinated roadmap to guide the process, which EUCOM can offer.
Everyone—including the Europeans—agrees that Europe must step up and take on a greater share of its on defense. But before Europe can take the lead, it must address a critical organizational gap. Without effective coordination, building a military force that is both interoperable and credible will be next to impossible. In the short term, EUCOM can help perform that role, and in doing so, serve as the bridge to a future where Europe leads in its own continental defense.
Sara Bjerg Moller is an Associate Teaching Professor in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and an Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Defense Program at CNAS.
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