The Trump administration sent shockwaves across the Atlantic last week with its new National Security Strategy. The strategy’s dismissal of the threat from Russia and harsh criticisms of Europe and NATO led the German chancellor to describe elements of the strategy as “unacceptable,” and to call for Europe to become “much more independent of the United States in security policy.” Meanwhile, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said the strategy was “largely consistent” with Moscow’s vision—never a good sign.
Thankfully, bipartisan majorities of Americans and their representatives in Congress remain clear-eyed about the threat from Moscow and believe supporting NATO and Ukraine serves American interests.
Consider the contrasting views on Russia, NATO, and Ukraine.
To its credit, the new NSS acknowledges that Europe remains strategically “vital to the United States” and that “Transatlantic trade remains one of the pillars of the global economy and of American prosperity.” Yet unlike the first Trump administration’s National Security Strategy of 2017, which said Russia was seeking to “shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests,” the new one fails even to identify Russia as a U.S. adversary. Worse still, the strategy says that the leading problems facing Europe are cultural issues and “civilizational erasure”; the continent’s adversarial relations with Russia, it says, are largely the fault of NATO’s expansion and Europe’s “lack of self-confidence.”
Those are talking points Putin loves. They also seem dissonant with the U.S. intelligence community’s 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment, which described Russia as an “enduring potential threat to U.S. power, presence, and global interests” that is one of several countries “challenging U.S. interests in the world by attacking or threatening others in their regions.”
Putin doesn’t like NATO expansion because he knows that when a country joins the alliance, it becomes more costly to bully, coerce, or invade. NATO is not an offensive threat to Russia; Moscow long left its borders with alliance members relatively free of fortifications. Putin resents democracies that arm themselves to thwart his imperial ambitions. Predators prefer vulnerable prey.
To be clear, the biggest problem facing European security is Putin’s war of naked aggression and imperial conquest.
In a famous 1983 speech on the Soviet Union to the National Association of Evangelicals, Ronald Reagan warned against labeling both sides in the Cold War “equally at fault,” cautioned against ignoring “the facts of history and the aggressive impulses” of Moscow, and called the Soviet Union “an evil empire.”
Thankfully, like Reagan, most Americans see Moscow clearly. The latest 2025 Reagan National Defense Survey, released this month, found that 79 percent of Americans view Russia as an “enemy,” while 70 percent of respondents said they distrust Russia to honor any peace agreement with Ukraine. That is smart given Moscow’s history.
The realistic views of Americans regarding Russia are reflected in the latest version of the National Defense Authorization Act negotiated by bipartisan leaders of the Senate and House armed services committees and passed on Wednesday by the U.S. House of Representatives. The legislation would require detailed reports on Russian military capabilities, hybrid warfare, and cooperation with other U.S. adversaries, as well as on American deterrence and military force posture in Eastern Europe.
It is worth remembering that in June, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine told Congress, that Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea “are pursuing unprecedented levels of cooperation” to threaten U.S. interests around the world.
The contrast between the administration and the American public and Congress is also evident when it comes to Ukraine. The administration has resisted imposing sufficient consequences on Putin for the war he started, pursued at times a “peace at any cost” approach, and placed more pressure on Kyiv than Moscow. At times, it has stood reality on its head, insisting that the invaded democracy provoked the authoritarian invader.
By contrast, the Reagan survey found that 62 percent of Americans want Ukraine to prevail over Russia, and 64 percent support sending U.S. weapons to Ukraine. Sixty-nine percent of respondents went so far as to say they support an Article 5-style collective security guarantee for Ukraine, while roughly three-quarters support a European-led security force backed by U.S. airpower.
Reflecting this American support for Ukraine, the NDAA would extend and authorize more funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. It also requires the Defense Department to notify Congress within 48 hours of any pause, restriction, or termination of intelligence support to Ukraine, which the administration temporarily cut off last spring. The NDAA also extends the prohibition on the recognition of Russian sovereignty over Ukrainian territory, which the administration has considered.
Similarly, differences can be seen when it comes to NATO. Whereas the first Trump administration’s NSS identified Russia’s desire to “weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe,” the 2025 NSS does that all on its own by describing the viability of NATO as “an open question.” To make matters worse, the administration has added damaging action to this damaging rhetoric, reducing U.S. military force posture in Eastern Europe and reportedly planning to cut security assistance funding for frontline NATO states. Unsurprisingly, this weakening of American deterrence in Europe has been paired with Russian incursions into NATO airspace.
Yet again, the NDAA demonstrates that Congress remains committed to the NATO alliance. The legislation authorizes continued U.S. security assistance funding in Eastern Europe and seeks to block the administration from further reducing the U.S. military force posture in Europe and to maintain American military leadership of NATO.
That also reflects the thinking of Americans. The Reagan survey found that 68 percent of Americans hold a favorable view of NATO, while 76 percent said they would support a U.S. military response if a NATO ally were attacked. Likewise, 59 percent opposed withdrawing from NATO, while an additional 18 percent opposed withdrawal after learning about increased defense-spending commitments from allies.
Good strategies and sound policy start with an objective assessment of interests and the leading and most likely threats to those interests. If the administration cannot even name Russia as the instigator of the largest war in Europe since World War II and the leading threat to security and stability in Europe, that does not bode well for the protection of American interests there.
The Trump administration would be wise to listen to the American public and Congress and reconsider its approach to American interests in Europe. That would include coordinating with NATO allies for more European orders of American-made weapons for Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List program, restarting direct U.S. military aid to Kyiv, imposing stronger sanctions on the Kremlin, and halting any further cuts to U.S. military force posture and security assistance in Eastern Europe.
But these steps are only likely if the Trump administration rediscovers some of Ronald Reagan’s ability to distinguish friend from foe.
Cameron McMillan is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Center on Military and Political Power, where Bradley Bowman is senior director. Bradley also served on the advisory board for the 2025 Reagan National Defense Survey.
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