There is renewed debate over reducing the number of combatant commands, with advocates citing cost savings and improved unity of effort. Secretary Hegseth argues that streamlining command structures—particularly by cutting general and flag officer billets—would increase readiness. While views vary, one region stands out as strategically essential and well-suited for consolidation: the Western Hemisphere.
The current division between U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command creates a seam that adversaries exploit. A single, threat-based command—call it USAMERICOM—would replace fixed geographic boundaries with operational alignment against transnational threats: criminal networks, state-sponsored influence, cyber activity, and mass migration. These threats span regions and exploit existing command divides. Consolidation would improve strategic clarity, streamline authorities, and enhance unity of effort across North, Central, and South America—delivering greater impact at lower cost.
Threats at the seams
A military axiom holds that the enemy attacks at the seams: the gaps where units or command structures converge. These areas demand constant coordination and are inherently vulnerable. This applies not just tactically, as seen in Ukraine, but at the operational level where combatant commands intersect.
A military must also control key avenues into a battlespace to deny an enemy freedom of movement. If seams are vulnerable, the ability of an adversary to maneuver across them is even more dangerous. Historical examples—from U.S. restrictions on targeting Viet Cong supply routes in Cambodia to Ukraine’s current challenges with Russian logistics—underscore the risks of allowing threats to develop beyond operational reach.
NORTHCOM’s primary responsibilities include homeland defense, civil support, Arctic operations, and counterterrorism coordination. It also maintains defense cooperation with Canada and Mexico. Meanwhile, SOUTHCOM focuses on counter-narcotics operations, stability efforts, partner engagement, and humanitarian assistance across Central and South America. While these missions may appear distinct on paper, the reality is that security challenges in the Western Hemisphere do not respect arbitrary geographic boundaries. While the two commands are comparatively well-coordinated, the structural divide between them remains an obstacle.
SOUTHCOM’s JIATF-South and Joint Task Force Bravo—while effective within their lanes—lack the integrated authority or coordination to counter these hemispheric networks. The Coast Guard, often the primary operational force for these missions, is stretched thin and constrained by divided responsibilities and fragmented command relationships.
This operational seam has real and measurable consequences. In 2023, the U.S. interdicted only 11 percent of the estimated 1,800 metric tons of cocaine bound for its shores. Most of this flow originates in South America and moves through Central America and Mexico before entering the United States. Transnational criminal organizations exploit the command divide, jurisdictional overlap, and coordination gaps along this route. In 2022, SOUTHCOM tracked more than 4,500 suspected smuggling events but had the capacity to act on only 27 percent. NORTHCOM, meanwhile, lacks the authority or means to respond until threats reach its area, and that is often too late.
Human smuggling follows a similar pattern, with networks stretching from Venezuela and the Caribbean through the Darién Gap and into Mexico. In FY2023, CBP encountered more than 2.4 million migrants at the southwest border, many facilitated by transnational criminal organizations. By the time these networks reach U.S. territory, the opportunity for disruption has largely passed.
This flawed structure also hinders the United States’ ability to reverse the erosion of U.S. influence in its hemisphere. China and Russia are using economic coercion, disinformation, military cooperation, and corruption of regional elites to undermine democratic governance and overwhelm fragile state institutions. China now controls critical infrastructure in Panama, Jamaica, and the Bahamas, including long-term leases at both entrances to the Panama Canal. Even traditional U.S. partners like Chile and Brazil are accepting Chinese investments that expand Beijing’s access and influence. Russia, meanwhile, sustains the Maduro regime in Venezuela through arms sales, intelligence collaboration, and financial support, contributing to regional instability and the forced migration of over 7.5 million people, the largest displacement in Western Hemisphere history. The U.S. military should have one command to respond to these hemispheric efforts, not two.
Reform
The responsibilities of combatant commands are delineated by the Unified Command Plan, but these boundaries are often more bureaucratic than strategic. Wherever they are drawn, alternative alignments can be justified—but the decisive criterion should be mission effectiveness, not geography. Past realignments, such as moving Israel from EUCOM to CENTCOM or creating AFRICOM to consolidate U.S. engagement in Africa, show that restructuring is feasible and sometimes necessary. Even more than other theaters, the Western Hemisphere is a tightly connected threat environment that defies arbitrary borders. Indeed, key national-security stakeholders—including the Joint Staff, DoD policy office, State Department, and National Security Council—already treat the Western Hemisphere as a single, integrated focus area.
One immediate benefit of consolidating NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM would be eliminating redundant command structures. Maintaining two geographic commands for a single, interdependent region creates unnecessary bureaucracy, slows decision-making, and duplicates staff functions. Merging them would streamline leadership, reduce overhead, and improve resource allocation. Unifying components like U.S. Army North and U.S. Army South would boost operational synergy, while reducing or even halving the number of required general and flag officer billets.
The span of control under a unified AMERICOM would remain manageable. It would integrate existing elements such as Alaskan Command, JTF-North, JTF-South, JTF-Bravo, and JIATF-South, along with service components from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and SOF. Many of these could be consolidated to further improve efficiency.
Consolidation would also elevate the command’s strategic profile. Unlike combat-centric commands like CENTCOM or INDOPACOM, USAMERICOM would offer a broader mission set with regional influence and strategic relevance. It could be uniquely suited for Coast Guard leadership. Coast Guard admirals already lead key missions—heading JIATF-South and serving as J3 in both of the hemisphere’s combatant commands—and bring unmatched expertise in homeland defense, interagency coordination, and Western Hemisphere operations.
But the greatest benefit would be improved effectiveness. A single combatant commander for the hemisphere would enable faster, more agile responses to crises like mass migration, cartel activity, or cyber intrusion—threats that cross domains and regions. Today, coordination between NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM is slowed by intelligence-sharing gaps and divided authorities. A unified command would streamline directives and improve homeland defense through synchronized action.
A unified combatant command would allow proactive interdiction rather than fragmented reaction. It would also serve as a single hub for intelligence-sharing with domestic agencies like DHS, DEA, and FBI, as well as foreign partners. Relationships are critical—especially in law enforcement—and consistent collaboration under one command would build trust, streamline coordination, and increase effectiveness. JIATF-South proves the concept, but its limited scope underscores the need for a command-wide solution.
Finally, a merger would also improve diplomatic engagement. Currently, Mexico coordinates with NORTHCOM, while its southern neighbors engage with SOUTHCOM—a split that hampers coherent regional partnerships. A merged command would strengthen security cooperation and offer a more strategic framework for U.S. engagement across the hemisphere. This includes aligning defense, economic assistance, and deterrence initiatives in the face of growing Chinese and Russian influence and improving the U.S. ability to respond to humanitarian crises and natural disasters.
Challenges
Despite its strategic logic, consolidation would face political and bureaucratic resistance. Congress and military leadership may oppose such restructuring due to concerns over command billets and jurisdiction. A successful transition would require deliberate planning and close coordination with Congress to avoid operational disruption.
It is also essential to ensure that regional priorities do not dilute focus on high-end threats. The Arctic remains a vital arena for great power competition, and any reorganization must preserve NORAD’s role and Arctic security. One option could be establishing NORAD as a standalone command under USAMERICOM to retain this focus while integrating broader hemispheric operations.
China and Russia already treat the Western Hemisphere as a unified target, using economic, informational, and proxy means to undermine U.S. influence. Maintaining separate commands only reinforces a fragmented approach. A unified USAMERICOM would close these seams and force a more coherent strategy—one that aligns homeland defense with transnational threat realities.
Consolidating NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM into AMERICOM is not a bureaucratic exercise. One command focused on the entire region would offer a more holistic bastion defense, rather than a narrow posture fixed at the border. It would enable earlier action, improved intelligence integration, and continuous coordination. And it would unify counter-narcotics, migration interdiction, cyber defense, and regional influence efforts under a single chain of command—tailoring responses to how threats actually operate, not where they happen to fall on a map.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position or policy of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Dr. Jason Smith is a professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College. He has served in the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Army, as advisor to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, as Senior Policy Advisor in the U.S. Senate, and on the National Security Council.
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